There are moments when Eden's language is pure neo-con, with "the Bear" (Russia) for Osama bin Laden. "I have no doubt that the Bear is using (Nasser) to further his aims . . . to dislodge the West from the Middle East . . . to get a foothold in Africa so as to dominate the continent . . . for subversion as our colonies achieve self-government". The hazard was the greatest facing the Free World since 1940. Unless Nasser backed down, military action was unavoidable, he told Eisenhower. The French, Dutch and Germans, said Eden, were already on board. A coalition of the willing was in place.
Eisenhower clearly had enough of this. In a carefully drafted letter on September 2, he is unequivocal: "I am afraid, Anthony, that from this point onward our views on this situation diverge". He warned that British sabre-rattling and military preparations were solidifying support for Nasser across the Middle East: "American opinion flatly rejects the thought of using force". Force would disrupt oil supplies rather than protect them. It would strengthen Nasser rather than deflate him. Besides, "there should be no thought of military action before the influences of the United Nations are fully explored".
To Eisenhower the most likely outcome of war was "Arabs rallying firmly to Nasser's support". In addition, wrote the President, "it might cause a serious misunderstanding between our two countries". Americans took the view that "the United Nations was formed to prevent this very thing". Nasser might well get the UN to brand any operation against him as "aggression". What was wrong with on-the-ground inspection under UN auspices to ensure that the Canal was kept open to shipping?
Eisenhower added that Eden's reference to Suez precipitating "an ignoble end to our long history" was a gross exaggeration of Nasser's importance. So too were Eden's frequent references to Mussolini and Hitler.
The letters read like those of a mature observer dealing with a jumpy and obsessive friend. Eisenhower, perhaps under Dulles's influence, was an unsympathetic correspondent. His approach shows little understanding of Eden's domestic predicament. It compares ill with the friendly collusion between Reagan and Thatcher during the Falklands War (which America also at first opposed). As Thatcher wrote in her memoirs, the President privately (by phone) "emphasised that America could not put a NATO ally and long-standing friend on the same level as Argentina and would do what he could to help".
The fact was that the pressure on Eden was appalling. Public opinion was fiercely pro-war, stirred by a jingoist press (staffed by many war veterans).
Nasser had Britain over a barrel and the public did not want him appeased. The Labour Party's opposition to the war and that of the Observer newspaper were intensely unpopular. The Labour leader, Gaitskell, was viciously attacked wherever he went. With Mountbatten's fleet preparing to sail, belatedly, from Cyprus to Egypt, the nation was eager for war. It was barely conceivable that Eden, with only a few Cabinet backsliders, could back down in the face of Nasser's snub.
Worse, Eden was getting conflicting signals from Washington. Despite Eisenhower's letters, Macmillan was reporting disingenuously from Washington that the administration in reality accepted Britain's position and was "determined to bring Nasser down". He claimed that Eisenhower understood Britain must win, or "the structure of her economy" would collapse. Dulles might be duplicitous but, said Macmillan, America would not let Britain down. In particular he indicated that America would do nothing to endanger sterling, a false assumption. Suez is nowadays cited as one of the rare cases of an economic sanction -America's toleration of a run on sterling -that "worked".
It changed British policy within days.
Yet Eden could not claim that Eisenhower deceived him. The letters could not be clearer. On October 30, Washington was getting intelligence signals of collusion between the British, French and Israelis, long denied in London.
