These were the men on whom Eden thought he could rely as he prepared to make war on Egypt in September and October of 1956. Few mysteries remain over that story, and many of the letters between Eden and Eisenhower have found their way into the history books. But the correspondence is only now published in its entirety, lasting throughout Eden's brief premiership, from spring 1955 to the end of 1956. It forms a fascinating vignette, charting a relationship decaying from geniality through deception to disaster. The letters have been immaculately edited by Peter G. Boyle, with an introduction to the personalities and points at issue and with judicious concluding remarks.

The correspondence naturally divides into two parts, pre-Suez (April 1955-July

1956) and from Suez to Eden's subsequent resignation. They are overture and grand opera. The early letters are dull, as if each side is keeping them going for form's sake. The two men do not seem personally close, as Churchill was to Roosevelt and Thatcher to Reagan. Eisenhower addresses Eden as "Dear Anthony", but the latter replies "Dear Mr President", and only later "Dear Friend".

Personal meetings are foreshadowed, "concerns" rehearsed, natural disasters regretted. Russian influence is deplored everywhere. Britain and America seem as one, albeit often in matters of little consequence. Eden thanks Eisenhower for "supplying certain specialised bombing equipment for the Canberras in India" (surely an aide's insert). He adds "we will now do everything we can to keep the Russians out of India".

After March 1956, the letters become more substantive and the bulk is one-way, as if Eden sensed waning ardour in his partner. Above all, the issue is Eden's obsession with Nasser's supposed plan to bring Revolution to the oil sheikhdoms of the Middle East and, as he sees it, open up the region to Soviet influence.

On this, Eisenhower is mostly silent or non-committal, agreeing merely that "we should not be acquiescent in any measure which would give the Bear's (Russia's) claws a grip on the production or transportation of vital oil".

Nasser's action against the Canal in July 1956 electrifies the exchanges.

Public opinion across the Middle East -and in Britain -is galvanized. To Eden the Russians are now hovering over Egypt. The one-year-old Baghdad Pact is in jeopardy. With the ghost of Munich hovering over Downing Street, Eden's first thought is of military action, as he informs Eisenhower within twenty-four hours of the seizure, on July 27.

Eisenhower could not have been clearer in response. War was not acceptable merely to "protect national or individual investors", he wrote, nor should "the legal rights of sovereign nations be ruthlessly flouted". If force were used and American help invoked, he warned Eden, this needed Congressional support, which would only be forthcoming if "every peaceful means of resolving the difficulty had previously been exhausted". American opposition would otherwise be "severe". All that mattered as far as oil was concerned was the efficient working of the Canal.

Eden's response was long and anguished. Eisenhower clearly did not understand Nasser's geopolitical significance. The Canal was not the sole issue. There had to be a change of regime in Egypt for the threat to be lifted. "Nasser is active wherever Muslims can be found . . . from the Persian Gulf to Nigeria", Eden wrote. If the West could force Nasser to "regorge his spoils" it was "improbable" that he would remain in power. Leave him and the Russians would rush in and "the whole position in the Middle East would thereby be lost beyond recall". Eisenhower's reply four days later was devastating: "What you say is very much in our thoughts . . . . I was glad to hear from Foster that you are looking so well. With warm personal regards, D. E."